In defense of real Cartesian motion. by Thomas,  Emily
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
05 December 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Thomas, Emily (2015) 'In defense of real Cartesian motion.', Journal of the history of philosophy., 53 (4). pp.
747-762.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2015.0067
Publisher's copyright statement:
Copyright c© 2015 The Johns Hopkins University Press. This article ﬁrst appeared in Journal of the History of
Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue 4, October 2015, pages 747-762.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
In Defense of Real Cartesian Motion: A Reply to Lennon 
 
On Thomas Lennon’s (2007) “Eleatic” reading of Descartes, the Cartesian world is in 
reality motionless, its motions conceived as mere phenomenal appearances. Lennon is aware 
that this radical reading appears to be at odds with various Cartesian texts that seemingly 
describe real motions, and accordingly he reinterprets these texts in such a way as to render 
them compatible with his reading. 
This reply to Lennon considers many further Cartesian texts that cannot be 
“reinterpreted” along the lines Lennon describes, with the ultimate aim of showing that the 
phenomenalist is committed to dividing Cartesian texts into passages dealing with reality and 
with appearance. I argue there are good reasons not to read Descartes in this way, and we 
should take Cartesian motion at face value: to be real.   
 
Key words: Descartes, phenomenalism about motion, material bodies, moving space  
 
1 Introduction 
 
 Thomas Lennon has argued for an innovative “Eleatic” reading of Descartes. At its 
heart is the thesis that Descartes is a phenomenalist about motions; with this in place, Lennon 
goes on to argue that Descartes is also a phenomenalist about individual material bodies. 
Conjuring up the ghosts of Eleatics such as Parmenides, Lennon describes a Cartesian 
material world in which moving, individual bodies are appearances, not realities. This paper 
takes issue with Lennon’s thesis that Cartesian motion is phenomenal.  
Section 2 of the paper details Lennon’s Eleatic reading, setting out his arguments and 
placing them in scholarly context. Lennon is aware that his reading is radical, and he 
considers various passages in Descartes that appear to be inconsistent with it. In response to 
texts seemingly describing moving bodies, Lennon argues that they merely refer to the 
mobility of matter. This move is similar to that made by Alice Sowaal, who offers a partially 
phenomenalist reading of Cartesian motions.  
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Section 3 demonstrates that there are a great many additional Cartesian texts that 
cannot be reconciled with the Eleatic reading in the way that Lennon describes, with the 
ultimate aim of showing that the phenomenalist is committed to carving up Descartes’s 
system into texts dealing with reality and texts dealing with appearance. Against this, I 
argue—drawing in part on these ‘problematic’ Cartesian texts—that we have good reasons to 
deny that Descartes carves up his system in this way. The costs of reading Descartes as a 
phenomenalist about motion outweigh the benefits, even though, as we will see, the realist 
must accept the seemingly strange view that the parts of Cartesian space move. Section 4 
concludes.   
 
2 Lennon’s Eleatic Descartes 
 
Lennon finds commonalities between the metaphysics of Parmenides and Descartes. 
Parmenides conceives the world as a plenum—a matter-filled space—in which nothing really 
moves. Descartes conceives the material world as a plenum and Lennon argues that Descartes 
also takes motions to be phenomenal. By “phenomenal,” Lennon means “mind-dependent.”1  
Phenomenalism about motions is not alien to seventeenth century metaphysics. For example, 
Leibniz variously describes motion as a “relative phenomena” and as “ideal.” 2 Although the 
best way of understanding these remarks is debated
3
, crucially Leibniz makes such remarks. 
In contrast, Descartes does not: nowhere in the Cartesian corpus is motion described as 
phenomenal, or ideal.  
Nonetheless, Lennon argues that phenomenalism about motions is implicit in 
Descartes. Lennon is driven to this view via a consideration of various Cartesian positions, 
and he puts forward two arguments in support of it.  
The first argument is “physical.” In a plenum, a body can only move when another 
body moves to make way for it. In Descartes’s system, bodies move in shuffling rings around 
centers, known as vortices
4
; they are akin to whirlwinds or whirlpools. Lennon raises several 
physical problems for vortex theory, arguing that it “seems to undo any notion of natural 
causation” because all the bodies in a vortex must move simultaneously or not all; hence, the 
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motion of none can be prior to “and thus qualify as” the cause of the motion of some other. 
Further, no constituent body can be the cause of the vortex’s motion, as every body has the 
same force at the same time.
 5
 
Lennon’s second argument is “metaphysical.” The argument comprises three premises 
that are defended at length, and I merely give their bones here. 
Understanding the first premise requires some background. For Descartes, a body’s 
“internal place” is the space it takes up in length, breadth and depth. A body’s “external 
place” is the surface immediately surrounding what is in the place. 6 On Descartes’s strict 
definition of motion, “motion is the transfer of  . . .  one body, from the vicinity of the other 
bodies which are in immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the 
vicinity of other bodies.”7 Lennon argues that this definition implicitly “connects” motion 
with external place.
8
 The idea is that when a body moves—transfers away from its vicinity of 
neighboring bodies—its external place changes.  
Lennon’s second premise argues that when a body changes external place it also 
changes internal place.
9
 Lennon holds that Descartes individuates—i.e. differentiates— 
material bodies by motion: “a body is as much of matter as moves together.” 10 This is based 
on Descartes’s statement, “By ‘one body’ or ‘one piece of matter’ I mean whatever is 
transferred at a given time.” 11 Motion is change in external place, so bodies are individuated 
by changing external place. As Lennon puts it, the “relations of situation”—the relations 
between a body and those around it, its external place—are “precisely what make possible the 
individuation of bodies.” 12 For Descartes, a body is its internal place: “There is no real 
distinction between space, or internal place, and the corporeal substance said to be contained 
in it; the only difference lies in the way in which we are accustomed to conceive of them.” 13 
So motion—change in external place—individuates internal places. As Lennon reads 
Descartes, internal place has been defined such that external place changes only when body 
changes internal place. 
Lennon’s third premise argues that a body cannot change its internal place. 14 There is 
only a conceptual distinction between a body and its place. A conceptual distinction holds 
between a substance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is 
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unintelligible; it is opposed to a “real distinction” which exists only between two or more 
substances.
 15
 As there is no real distinction between material substance and space, the 
Cartesian world is a plenum. A body cannot change its internal place because it is really 
identical to its place; a body cannot move away from its place any more than Hesperus can 
move away from Phosphorus.   
As there is no motion without change in external place, and there is no change in 
external place without change in internal place—which is impossible—Lennon concludes 
that real motion is impossible. No real motions entails no way of individuating material 
bodies. For Lennon, Descartes is akin to Parmenides.  
Lennon is aware that his Eleatic reading appears to conflict with Cartesian texts that 
prima facie assert a plurality of moving, mind-independent bodies, and he spends time 
reinterpreting those texts so as to bring them in line with his Eleatic reading. I will discuss the 
one text Lennon provides on motion. This is Principles II.23, which is headed, “All the 
variety in matter, all the diversity of its forms, depends on motion.” The passage explains that 
all the matter existing in the universe is the same, and all the properties which we perceive in 
it “are reducible to its divisibility and consequent mobility” in respect of its parts. 16 Lennon’s 
response to this text is as follows: 
 
<ext> 
This [the heading] sounds as if matter must actually be in motion. But the text of the article 
asserts, not the actual motion of matter and its division into parts, but only its mobility and 
divisibility, to which all the properties that we perceive in it are reducible.
 17
  
</ext> 
 
Lennon is arguing that, in reality, the nature of extended substance is mobile and divisible. 
This nature gives rise to the phenomenal appearance of moving, individual bodies. Extended 
substance is mobile and divisible but it never actually moves or is divided.  
Sowaal takes a similar approach to Lennon. These scholars interpret Descartes 
differently but they agree to some extent that motions and individual bodies are phenomenal. 
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For Lennon, motion is fully phenomenal; in contrast, Sowaal holds that it is partly 
phenomenal.
 18
 In the context of considering a possible objection to her view, Sowaal also 
discusses Principles II.23: 
 
<ext> 
[N]ote that when Descartes names the tools he will use to describe phenomena, he refers to 
modalities: to divisibility, not to actual divisions; to mobility, not to actual motions  . . .  
Therefore, the explanations that Descartes seeks in his physics need not be in terms of ‘facts’ 
about bodies, but in terms of the divisibility and mobility of extended substance.
 19
  
</ext> 
 
Lennon and Sowaal agree that this text can be read as describing the mobility of matter, not 
actual motions.  
Lennon’s Eleatic reading advances many controversial theses. The thesis that 
Cartesian matter is individuated by motion is commonplace but not undisputed.
 20
 The thesis 
that Descartes is a monist about material substance is shared by some scholars but is widely 
disputed.
 21
 The thesis that material bodies are phenomenal is extremely controversial, though 
it is shared by Sowaal. The unique aspect of Lennon’s interpretation is the fully 
phenomenalist reading of Cartesian motions. Radical though the Eleatic reading is, Lennon’s 
underlying strategy—working through what he takes to be the implications of Descartes’s 
natural philosophy—is sound, and the result is a rich and creative interpretation of Descartes.   
 
 
3 Reading Cartesian Texts on Motions 
 
In this section I show that there are many Cartesian texts not amenable to 
reinterpretation in the way that Lennon describes, with the aim of drawing out an implicit 
phenomenalist commitment that—I will argue—is problematic. Although I do not provide a 
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premise-by-premise critique of the arguments utilised by Lennon’s Eleatic reading, along the 
way I will discuss various responses to them.  
 
 
3.1 Additional Cartesian texts that are “problematic” for the Eleatic reading 
 
 Historians of philosophy are frequently interested in whether the views found in some 
historical figure are philosophically consistent, in the sense that they can be held together 
without contradiction (obvious or otherwise). For example, substance dualism is consistent 
with theism; in contrast, substance dualism is inconsistent with substance monism. Historians 
often employ a ‘principle of charity’: on finding a view in some text that is prima facie 
inconsistent with another view in the same text, they attempt to reinterpret one or both views 
to render them consistent.
 22
  
When Lennon describes passages such as Principles II.23 as “problematic,” he means 
that they appear to be inconsistent with the Eleatic reading; by reinterpreting these passages, 
Lennon is attempting to render them consistent. Lennon’s Eleatic reading is primarily 
grounded in the Principles and, when dealing with a text as carefully constructed as this, I 
agree that we should attempt to interpret Descartes’s views in a way that renders them 
consistent. However, against Lennon, I argue that the Principles and many other texts contain 
passages that cannot be “reinterpreted” in the way he describes. I have selected three sets of 
passages—on vortices, corpuscularianism, and mind-body interaction—that discuss motions 
explicitly and at length. The passages on vortex theory are particularly important because 
they show how seriously Descartes takes it, undermining Lennon’s physical argument.   
Descartes’s vortex theory has received relatively little scholarly attention. 23 As 
Pasnau puts it, the English Descartes is “sanitized” of his vortices. 24 The current major 
English translation of Descartes’s Principles—CSM I—does not translate large chunks of 
Parts Three and Four, those largely concerned with vortex theory. And yet, vortex theory 
underlies major parts of Descartes’s work.    
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Vortices power Descartes’s cosmogony, his account of how the universe arrived at its 
current state. The World explains how a real, solid body of matter could become the familiar 
visible world: 
 
<ext> 
Let us add that this matter may be divided into as many parts having as many shapes as we 
can imagine, and that each of the parts is capable of taking on as many motions as we can 
conceive. Let us suppose, moreover, that God really divides it into many such parts, some 
larger and some smaller, some of one shape and some of another  . . .  From the first instant 
of their creation, he causes some to start moving in one direction and others in another.
 25
 
</ext> 
 
The first sentence in this passage is compatible with Lennon’s interpretation that matter is 
mobile but not in motion; however, the second sentence is not. Having explained that the 
parts are capable of motion, Descartes asks us to suppose moreover—translated from Et 
supposons de plus—that matter really is divided, and that at creation God causes the parts of 
matter to move.
 26
 A little later, The World describes how flames have moving parts. In this 
context, Descartes writes: 
 
<ext> 
I believe that countless different motions go on perpetually in the world  . . .  the air is forever 
agitated by the winds, that the sea is never at rest  . . .  there is nothing anywhere which is not 
changing. From this I know clearly that a flame is not the only thing in which there are a 
number of minute parts in ceaseless motion, but that every other body has these parts.
27
  
</ext> 
 
Again, this passage is not open to reinterpretation along Lennon’s lines.     
Part Two of the Principles expands on Descartes’s cosmogony:  
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<ext> 
God imparted various motions to the parts of matter when he first created them, and he now 
preserves all this matter in the same way, and by the same process by which he originally 
created it  . . .  this fact alone makes it most reasonable to think that God likewise always 
preserves the same quantity of motion in matter.
28
 
</ext> 
 
I will say more on this passage below. Part Three details the three kinds of matter or 
“elements” that make up the visible world. After creation, these elements formed celestial 
bodies. For example, “they moved (motas) individually and separately about their own 
centers, so as to form a fluid body such as we take the heavens to be.”29  
Vortices underlie the cosmology found in Part Three of the Principles. Here is 
Descartes on planetary movements: 
 
<ext> 
[S]uppose that the whole of the celestial matter in which the planets are located turns 
continuously like a vortex with the sun at its centre. Further, let us suppose that the parts of 
the vortex which are nearer the sun move more swiftly than the more distant parts . . .  This 
single supposition enables us to understand all the observed movements of the planets.
30
 
</ext> 
 
This supposition allows Descartes to explain the speeds of planetary revolutions: Mercury 
moves faster than Mars because it is closer to the centre of the vortex.
31
 Strictly, Descartes 
argues that the Earth does not move because, although it orbits the Sun, it does not move 
from the pocket of celestial material that encloses it.
32
 Galileo was persecuted for holding that 
the Earth moved and Descartes wished to avoid this; unsurprisingly, scholars debate whether 
Descartes’s denial that the Earth moves is a smokescreen for Copernicanism.33 If motions 
were phenomenal, this would provide Descartes with another way of denying Earthly 
movement; it is telling that there is no suggestion of this. Descartes’s cosmology also uses 
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vortical motion to explain the movements of satellites around planets, sunspots, comets, and 
the lifecycle of stars.
34
  
The phenomenalist could disregard Descartes’s writings on cosmogony and 
cosmology on the grounds that (as above) Descartes describes these theories as 
“suppositions.” Even if we disregard them—and, below, I will argue we should not—
Cartesian physics offers many more theories involving vortical motion that are not so 
described. For example, Part Three of the Principles explains light propagation as the force 
by which elements “attempt to move away” from their centers.35 Vortices play key roles in 
many further theories—including gravity, tides, and magnetism36—unifying Descartes’s 
physics at a deep level.    
Given how problematic these texts on vortices would appear to be for the Eleatic 
reading, why does Lennon not consider them? I suspect the answer lies in Lennon’s physical 
argument, the presentation of which suggests that Lennon takes vortices to face insuperable 
problems. This suspicion is supported by a footnote Lennon provides later
37
, referencing 
Kenny’s view that motion is physically impossible on the Cartesian system.38 If Lennon also 
holds this view, it would explain why he does not consider texts concerning vortices: they 
face such insuperable difficulties that Lennon cannot conceive that Descartes intends them 
literally.  
In response to such a position, there are two points to be made. First, while Cartesian 
vortex theory faces problems, they may not be insuperable. As Lennon himself notes
39
, one 
solution to the difficulties would be to adopt an occasionalist reading of Descartes, on which 
force is provided by God. Natural causation could take place in a vortex if we read Descartes 
as allowing simultaneous causes and effects, on which the motion of one body can be 
simultaneous with the motion of another yet qualify as the cause of it.
40
 Further solutions 
present themselves depending on how one understands Cartesian force.
41
  
Second, even if the physical difficulties facing Cartesian vortex theory are 
insuperable, this is not obviously apparent. As Aiton demonstrates
42
, Cartesian vortex theory 
rivaled Newtonian physics for over a century. Vortex theory is central to Descartes’s natural 
philosophy, and there are no indications that Descartes perceived insuperable difficulties in it. 
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Natural philosophers have often held theories that are later discovered to face insuperable 
difficulties, such as geocentrism. However, the fact we now know geocentrism to be mistaken 
does not by itself provide reason to refrain from attributing it to Aristotle or Tycho. Similarly, 
even if vortex theory is mistaken, that does not by itself provide reason to refrain from 
attributing it to Descartes.
43
     
The second set of texts that are seemingly incompatible with the Eleatic reading 
concern Descartes’s corpuscularianism, a key part of which is the attempt to reduce all the 
properties of material bodies to a small restricted set of properties, including size, shape and 
motion. These are known as “primary qualities,” as opposed to “secondary qualities”; 
although these terms are found in the likes of Locke rather than Descartes, it is widely 
accepted that a similar distinction is in play.
44
  
In The World Descartes argues that the qualities called “heat,” “cold,” “moisture” and 
“dryness”—and “all the others as well”—can be explained by supposing nothing in their 
matter “other than the motion, size, shape and arrangement of its parts.”45 Shortly after, 
whilst setting out his cosmogony, Descartes asks us to imagine of that solid body of matter 
that it lacks the qualities of being hot or cold, dry or moist, and of having any taste, smell, 
sound or color. After God causes the parts of this body of matter to move, the chaos will 
arrange itself into good order, “a world in which we shall be able to see not only light but also 
all the other things… which appear in the real world.”46 The implication is that it is only after 
God has introduced real motion into matter that light—and all the other qualities—emerge.  
A similar thesis can be found in Part Four of the Principles. In the context of 
describing the workings of our senses—touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight—Descartes 
writes: 
 
<ext> 
I have given an account of the various sizes, shapes and motions which are to be found in all 
bodies; and apart from these the only things which we perceive by our senses as being located 
outside us are light, color, smell, taste, sound and tactile qualities. And I have just 
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demonstrated that these are nothing else in the objects… but certain dispositions depending 
on size, shape and motion.
47
 
</ext> 
 
Again, Descartes is writing that secondary qualities depend on the primary qualities of 
bodies: sizes, shapes and motions. Lennon argues that the experienced qualities of bodies 
such as color are phenomenal
48
 but he does not explain how we should reinterpret texts such 
as these to bring them in line with the Eleatic reading.  
The third set of passages concern Descartes’s account of mind-body interaction. 
Motion is involved in both directions. 
In Part Four of the Principles
49
, Descartes claims that the body communicates sensory 
perceptions to the mind through movement. Descartes holds that the human soul has its 
“seat” in the brain, and its sensory awareness comes about by means of thread-like nerves 
which stretch from the brain to the limbs; hardly any part of the body can be touched without 
producing movement in nearby nerve-ends. “This movement is then transmitted to the other 
ends of the nerves which are all grouped together in the brain around the seat of the soul… 
[the soul] is affected in various ways, according to the various different sorts of 
movements.”50 The states of mind which are the “immediate result of these movements” are 
sensory perceptions.
51
 For example, in describing sight, Descartes explains that the 
extremities of our optic nerves are moved by elemental globules.
52
 As Cottingham puts it, 
Descartes appears to hold that in sense perception the “motions of matter in the external 
world impinge on the body and set up further motions there.”53 
  The mind also interacts with the body through movement. For example, in a 1643 
letter to Elisabeth, Descartes claims, “That the mind  . . .  can set the body in motion is 
something which is shown to us  . . .  by the surest and plainest everyday experience.”54 The 
Meditations writes that the mind directs the animal spirits flowing from the heart through the 
brain into the muscles and “determines them to certain motions.”55 Machamer and McGuire 
detail the “tight, substantial mind-body connection” at length, explaining how the soul can 
12 
 
produce “complex movements” in the body.56 However this connection is best understood, 
motions would appear to be key.  
All of these passages seem to be inconsistent with the Eleatic reading. They explicitly 
describe the movements of material bodies, and as such they cannot be reinterpreted as 
merely describing the mobility of matter.  
 
 
3.2 Dividing Descartes’s texts: on appearance and on reality 
 
In the face of such texts, there is another reply open to the phenomenalist. Where 
taken from the Principles, the passages above are found in Parts Two, Three and Four. 
Descartes lays out his fundamental metaphysics in Part One, whilst these latter Parts largely 
concern Descartes’s natural philosophy. The phenomenalist could carve up the Principles and 
argue that, in Part One, Descartes is discussing metaphysical realities; by the later Parts, 
Descartes has shifted the discussion ‘up’ to the level of appearances. This approach could be 
extended to The World and all the other texts that discuss real motions. On this reading, 
Descartes is offering us a science of appearances. His natural philosophy is explaining 
phenomena using phenomena: motions.  
Short of denying that these texts do assert real motions—which would be hugely 
implausible—the phenomenalist is committed to dividing up Descartes’s texts in this way.57 I 
argue this commitment is unpalatable, for two reasons.   
The first reason is grounded in Part One of the Principles, which claims that God has 
given us a faculty of perception which cannot incline to falsehood, so if we clearly and 
distinctly perceive something we can know it to be true.
58
 We clearly and distinctly perceive 
immaterial and material substance.
59
 Descartes’s faith in matter provides a stark contrast with 
card-carrying phenomenalists such as Leibniz.  
Towards the end of Part One, Descartes writes that the mind perceives “sizes, shapes 
and motions”60 which are presented as modes of things existing outside of thought.61 The 
opening of Part Two continues:  
13 
 
 
<ext> 
[A]s a result of sensory stimulation we have a clear and distinct perception of, some kind of 
matter, which is extended in length, breadth and depth, and has various differently shaped 
and variously moving parts which give rise to our various sensations of colors, smells, pain 
and so on. And if God were himself immediately producing in our mind the idea of such 
extended matter, or even if he were causing the idea to be produced by something which 
lacked extension, shape and motion, there would be no way of avoiding the conclusion that 
he should be regarded as a deceiver (my emphasis).
 62
   
</ext> 
 
This passage appears to straightforwardly claim that via sensory perception we clearly and 
distinctly perceive a kind of matter which has variously moving parts. If God produced an 
idea of moving parts in us, when in reality there were none, then God per impossibile would 
be a deceiver. In reality, matter has moving parts.  
 Unfortunately for the realist, matters are not quite so straightforward. The original text 
reads:  
 
<ext> 
Sed quia sentimus, sive potius a sensu impulsi clare ac distincte percipimus, materiam 
quandam extensam in longum, latum & profundum, cujus variae partes variis figuris 
praeditae sunt, ac variis motibus cientur, ac etiam efficiunt ut varios sensus habeamus 
colorum, odorum, doloris, &c.
63
  
</ext> 
 
On the CSM translation, we clearly and distinctly perceive matter which is extended and has 
variously shaped and moving parts. However, the Latin uses the relative pronoun cujus rather 
than a conjunction
64
, enabling an alternative translation: “ . . .  matter which is extended in 
length, breadth and depth, of which various parts are arranged in various figures, are moved 
14 
 
in various motions, and bring about that we have various sensations  . . . ”65 The 
phenomenalist could argue that we only have a clear and distinct perception of extended 
matter; the further claim that matter has shaped and moving parts is not a perception but is, 
say, an inference.    
 Although there is wiggle room in the translation, it is not overly helpful to the 
phenomenalist. This is because, on the proposed phenomenalist reading of this passage, 
Descartes is discussing reality (extended matter) and appearance (motions) in the same 
breath. If Descartes were distinguishing between levels of reality and appearances, a 
distinction reflected in the ordering of the Parts of the Principles, it would seem extremely 
unlikely that he would muddle together his metaphysics of reality and appearance in this way. 
As Descartes’s remarks on the clear and distinct perception of material substance must be 
taken literally—lest God be a deceiver—this gives us a strong reason to take this remark on 
motions literally too.  
The second reason to deny that Descartes’s natural philosophy is offering a science of 
appearances is based on a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis. Lennon states that Descartes is not merely 
committed to phenomenalism “but actually holds it.”66 Lennon’s reasoning appears to be that, 
because realism about motion is so problematic given Descartes’s physical and metaphysical 
principles, Descartes must actually be a phenomenalist about motion. Similarly, having 
discussed problems with Descartes’s account of motion, Sowaal explains that whilst most 
commentators suppose that Descartes is a realist about bodies “only to find his ontology to be 
riddled with problems,” commentators such as herself and Lennon have taken those problems 
seriously enough to develop idealist interpretations of Descartes.
67
 
Lennon and Sowaal are arguing that the benefits of interpreting Cartesian motion 
phenomenally—avoiding the physical and ontological problems entailed by the realist 
reading—outweigh the costs. Against this, I argue that a phenomenological reading entails a 
higher cost than has been appreciated: it breaks down the consistency of the Principles. To 
make this point, we will return to Descartes’s cosmogony and philosophy of mind.  
Above, I claimed that although Descartes describes his cosmogony as a supposition, 
we should not disregard it. This is because it plays several roles in Descartes’s system. For 
15 
 
example, Descartes argues that even though God created the world with all its current 
perfection (as in Genesis) it is better for us to understand the nature of the visible world— 
including men, plants, stars, and the Earth—by considering how it might have developed.68 
As Schuster and Brody have shown, Descartes’s cosmogony informs his physics, biology and 
physiology.
69
 Further, Descartes’s cosmogony provides another place for divine action in his 
system. Part One of the Principles explains that the same cause which originally produced us 
continually “keeps us” in existence.70 As we saw above, Part Two explains that just as God 
preserves matter, God “likewise” preserves the same quantity of motion in matter. How best 
to understand this conservation of motion is disputed
71
 but again Descartes links motion and 
change, leading him to write: “The very fact that creation is in a continual state of change is 
thus evidence of the immutability of God.”72 Continual change in the created world is 
grounded in God’s unchanging, continual preservation of motion since creation. Descartes’s 
views on the divine conservation of matter and motion are important because they provide 
God with immanent and indispensible roles in what would otherwise appear to be a decidedly 
mechanist universe. Matter is uncontroversially real for Descartes; as such, his claim that 
God “likewise” preserves matter and motion suggests that both are real. To claim otherwise 
diminishes the consistency of the text.  
Cartesian mind-body interaction is, of course, another thread that runs throughout the 
Principles. Part One states: 
 
<ext> 
[W]e also experience within ourselves certain other things which  . . .  arise, as will be made 
clear later on, in the appropriate place, from the close and intimate union of our mind with the 
body. This list includes, first, appetites like hunger and thirst; secondly, the emotions or 
passions of the mind which do not consist of thought alone  . . .  and finally, all the 
sensations, such as those of pain, pleasure, light, colors, smells.
73
  
</ext> 
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A footnote explains that the “appropriate place” is Part Four, referencing articles (that have 
been partially described above) such as the mechanisms of sensory perception. On a science 
of appearances, if motions are phenomenal, then anything grounded on motions—whether it 
be planetary orbits or light propagation—is phenomenal too. The problem for the 
phenomenalist is that Descartes’s mind-body union is bound up with mind-body interaction, 
and this is grounded on motions. This renders mind-body interaction hard to understand. If 
motions are phenomenal, how are we to understand the mechanisms by which the mind 
affects the body, or how the mind feels bodily pain? If mind-body interaction is phenomenal 
then it would seem that so too is the mind-body union, and the appetites, emotions and 
sensations that arise from it. This is difficult to square with Descartes’s claim that the mind-
body union is close and intimate (arcta & intima mentis nostrae cum corpore unione). The 
phenomenalist must reinterpret—and likely downplay—this intimacy, breaking down the 
consistency of the Principles between Parts One and Four.  
Against Lennon and Sowaal, I argue that these concerns over consistency upset the 
cost-benefit analysis, suggesting that a fully realist reading of Cartesian motion is less costly 
than a phenomenalist one. However, there is an important cost to accepting the realist reading 
that has not yet been taken into account.  
This cost is rejecting a very natural assumption: the parts of space cannot move. Hartz 
neatly articulates it: “Cartesian bodies, since they are regions of space, must remain locked 
forever in their positions in the “plenum space”.”74 I describe this assumption as ‘natural’ 
because it is difficult to imagine how parts of space could move; it is common to conceive 
space as a kind of fixed, immobile void, even if every part of space is filled with body. And 
yet, if one holds the third premise of Lennon’s metaphysical argument—a Cartesian body 
cannot change its internal place because there is no real distinction between a material body, 
its internal place and space—then accepting realism about Cartesian motion would appear to 
entail that the parts of space move. I do accept this premise and, natural though it may be, I 
reject the assumption that the parts of space cannot move.
75
   
Newton’s De Gravitatione provides us with a reason to deny that the parts of space 
can move (a view that, interestingly, he attributes to Descartes): 
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<ext> 
The parts of space are motionless. If they moved, it would have to be said either that the 
motion of each part is a translation from the vicinity of other contiguous parts, as Descartes 
defined the motion of bodies, and it has been sufficiently demonstrated that this is absurd.
76
 
</ext> 
 
But this reason would not find traction with Descartes. For Newton, it is absurd to hold that 
the parts of space move because Newton holds an ‘absolute’ account of motion, on which 
bodies move against a backdrop of absolute space, rather than relative to each other. As 
Descartes is not an absolutist, this is no reason for him to hold that the parts of space are 
motionless. As Huggett observes, “It is not clear how this argument secures Newton against 
the motion of the parts of space relative to one another.”77 Whilst it is strange to allow that 
the parts of Cartesian space move, it is perfectly possible.  
A way of making the thesis a little less strange is suggested in an illuminating 
discussion by Woolhouse:   
 
<ext> 
It is sometimes said that Descartes’s ‘spatialises body’, or says that ‘matter is space’. What 
seems to lie behind such assertions is the idea that Descartes begins with the picture of space 
as something independent of body, adds to this his ‘thin’ conception of body as mere 
extension, and so ends up with bodies as nothing other than ‘regions of space’. It is, of 
course, part of that picture of space that its parts or regions logically cannot move, and so the 
problem is raised for Descartes how body can move  . . .  [However] Descartes does quite the 
contrary  . . .  he corporealizes space.
78
  
</ext> 
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Descartes starts from material body, rather than from any kind of immobile void space. The 
motion of material bodies is familiar, and so the idea that their internal places or spaces can 
move turns out to be not quite so strange after all.   
 In fact, this thesis can be found in another early modern thinker: Margaret Cavendish. 
In her Philosophical Letters, Cavendish writes the following.  
 
<ext> 
I believe not that there is any more place than body; as for example, Water being mix’d with 
Earth, the water doth not take the Earths place, but as their parts intermix, so do their places  . 
. .  Say a man travels a hundred miles  . . .  this man has not been in a hundred thousand 
places, for he never had any other place but his own.
79
  
</ext> 
 
For Cavendish—as with Descartes—there is no place in addition to body. Further, when 
bodies move, they take their places with them. Similarly, I argue that for Descartes, when a 
body moves it takes its internal place and its space with it.  
Rejecting the assumption that the parts of space are immobile
80
 sets us on the path to 
dismantling Lennon’s metaphysical argument. Against the second premise, there is a way that 
a Cartesian body can change its external place without changing its internal place: when a 
body changes its external place—moving away from its current vicinity of bodies—it takes 
its internal place with it. Now, this is not quite enough to dismantle Lennon’s argument, for 
he individuates bodies by external place; consequently, a body that changes its external place 
is no longer the same body. Additionally then, one must pull apart the connection Lennon 
draws between motion, external place, and the individuation of bodies. There are several 
ways to do this. For example, one could argue that Descartes’s strict definition of motion 
does not connect to external place; Descartes certainly does not draw this connection 
explicitly. Alternatively, one could reject the assumption that bodies are individuated by 
motion at all. As explained above, several scholars have offered alternative accounts; for 
example, Normore has recently argued that Descartes takes the individuation of minds to be 
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primitive, and the same goes for bodies.
81
 The picture we end up with is akin to Cavendish’s: 
bodies move and take their (internal) places with them.  
To summarize, the phenomenalist is committed to carving up Descartes’s texts into 
those dealing with reality and those dealing with appearance, but there are good reasons not 
to: Descartes writes that via sensory perception we clearly and distinctly perceive motions, 
and the costs of endorsing phenomenalism are outweighed by the benefits. Although the 
realist is committed to the prima facie strange thesis that the parts of the space can move, this 
cost is preferable, especially once one realizes that it is really just bodies that are moving.  
 
   
4 Final Thoughts 
 
Lennon has done an admirable job of arguing for phenomenalism about motions in 
Descartes. However, in the absence of any textual evidence explicitly supporting this reading, 
Lennon’s claim that the view is implicit in Descartes is an uphill struggle. Lennon’s existing 
strategies cannot accommodate many Cartesian texts concerning motion, and there are good 
reasons to believe that these texts are discussing realities, not appearances.
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